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-such as the cold during the first war
winter in the USSR---<leprived them of it,
the German leaders constantly held tho
initiative in their hands. They· used it
wisely: after long periods of calm and
determined preparation, they carried out
brief, decisive thrusts. They never struck
unless they ..;were sure of the re.'lult and,
from the military point of view, they suf-
fered practically no failures. This was also
admitted by their foes in every case except
in that of the aerial campaign of Hl40 against
England which, the enemy claimed, had
fallen short of c~:pectation~.
If the war in Europe had continued with
the tempo of the first phase, it would have
been over long ago. But for various reasons
the first phase ended before the war did.
Germany went to war with the USSR
because she believed that she could no
longer afford passively to watch the rise of
the gigantic menace of two hundred million
people harnessed to Bolshevism. Nobody
had pointed out the danger of the Red
flood for Europe more emphaticaUy and more
consistently than the leaders of National-
Socialist Germany. Yet, to everybody's
surprise, it was..1ar greater than even they
had depicted ik
We must bear in mind that, before 1942,
the Soviet Union had been underrated
throughout "the world a..\l a fighting power:
(1) I\oIilitarily: the number of her trained
reserves, her available arms, her industrial
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T/ie filth anniver8ary and 'lie clim<n: of the European war are approach.i"9
all we go to pres". E1M'ope t4 an inferno. ThollMmd8 of plane8 are layiTl..g tl'GIlte
h.er cities. MiUioft4 of men arll loeked in terrible .baules. Compari"l1 the present
lfituation with 'Iud prtt-ailing in Europe on the fir8t. 8CCOrnJ, or third war CI1miver·
"aric8. and contrasting the destruction in human lives and material values thell and
tUnD. one realizes hoto romp/dely the character of the war hUll changed. Tile folluwing
cssay i8 ccmcerned wit" th;8 change, its cause8. meaning. and per8pect;1JIl8.
VOL. vn
SO far this wa.r has passed through twophases. The first, lasting thirty-eightmonths up to the Allied landing in
North Africa and the Red count,eroffensive
at Stalingrad, was one of colossal German
superiority, as the campaigns in Poland,
Norway, Western Europe, the Balkans,
North Africa, and Eastern Europe have
shown, when German forces reached Egypt
and the Volga and when Allied tonnage
was approaching its lowest point of about
twelve million tons. During this entire
pbMe, tho loss in life and property on both
sides was extremely small-small compared
with the results achieved and also compared
with the losses being suffered by the two
camps at present. It was the phase of the
German blitzes. Though the fighting never
ceased completely, it was concentrated
in 0. few short, highly successful campaigns.
Ever;}' war ha.'l its horrors, particularly
for tbe defeated side. But if war must be,
then the blitz war with small losses and
great political results is preferable. This is
true also for the defeated side. In a blltll
campa,ign it loses the war, which is bad
enough, but in a long-drawn-out war it
suffers in addition irreplaceable losses in life
and property. Historians, no matter of
which nationality, will some day classify
the German campaigns of the war's first
phase as exemplary military achievements.
Germany's overwhelming advantage lay
in her superiority in strategy, leadership,
training, arms, economic mobilization, and
national attitude toward the wa,r. Apart
from periods when objective circumstances
THE XXtb CENTURY
MATCHED POWER
Thus the fight put up by the USSR was
greater than anybody had expected. Uti-
lizing the vastness of its area, its manpower,
and its resources, the Red Army survived
the heavy blows dealt it by the German
Wehrmacht. This gave Roosevelt time,
with the aid of ~is huge politica.l machine
and thousands of leftist and Jewish intel-
leCtuals who control the intellectual life of
the country, to bring about a cha.nge in the
formerly pacifist-isolationist attitude of the
Americans toward foreign affairs and to put
the entire nation on a war basis.
Germany's blitzkrieg strategy required
for its success the unpreparedness of the
enemy for this type of war. The longer the
war lasted, the more her enemies were able
to learn from it. This was the reason why
it functioned 80 smoothly in 1939 and 1940,
less well in 1941 and 1942 against the Soviets,
who had had two years' time to adapt them-
selves, and why it did not work in 1943
and 1944, when the Allies were not only
familiar with it but even began to employ it
themselves, including total mobilization. In
other words: in 1939 and 1940 the stre.tegy
of the second World War employed by
Germany triumphed easily over the strategy
of the first World War still employed by
the Allies. By 1944 both sides were fully
versed in modern warfare.
1£ we add that by means of technical
innovations the Allies were able, at least
temporarily, to neutralize the German sub-
marines, and finally that they were aided
by two cases of treason-Darlan's and
Badoglio's-we have mentioned all the
principal reasons why the war's first phase
came to an end. We see now why Ger-
many, although having many more soldiers,
tanks, planes, guns, and an even more
determined population than in the days of
the French campaign, no longer possesses
her unchallenged superiority and why the
wa.r entered upon its second phase, that of
matched power. By matched power we do
not mean that both sides are evenly matched
in every respect-the Allies have more men,
arms, raw ma.terials, the Germans a higher
quality of soldiers and officers and a more
fa.vora.ble strategic position. We mean that
both sides are matched from the point of
view of their fighting strength as a whole,
and that neither side has the overpowering
superiority which Germany held during the
first years. Just as it was characteristic of
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capacity to produce more, and her ability
to conduct a modern war, were not properly
evaluated; and the purge of the Red generals
in 1937, as well as the poor showing of the
Red Army in Finland in 1939, were over-
rated in their significance.
(2) Politically: the long series of purges
from 1935 to 1938 was taken as an indication
of internal weakness, while actually it was
primarily an indication of Stalin's change-
over to a new type of world-revolutionary
strategy, a change-over with which many
old Bolsheviks did not agree. Moreover,
the whole world had always made a radical
distinction between the Bolshevist leaders
and the Russian people, a circumstance
which led to the belief that the Russian
people would turn against the Bolsheviks
after the first powerful thrusts from out-
side.
(3) Psychologically: the Russians were
assumed to be by nature incapable of sus-
tained effort over a long period. After a
first fiare-up of energy had spent itself, they
would, it was believed, relapse into apathy.
I
These opinions, held by the majority of
people everywhere, were due to a faulty
evaluation of the USSR as well as of the
Russians. The first was chiefly the result
of many people in every country continuing
to see the SO\'iet state as it had been in the
years of Revolution and Civil War and
closing their eyes to the hundred million
children born since then and permeated
with Bolshevist ideas, to the thousands of
industrial plants built, and to the strangle-
hold which the Bolsheviks had acquired over
their people by a ghastly combination of
terror and propaganda. The misunderstand-
ing of t.he Russians, on the other hand, was
la.rgely due to the Russian literature of the
nineteenth century. In this literature, the
classical heroes are the "useless people,"
from Eugene Onegin to the owners of
Chekhov's Cherry Orchard. Oblomov, who
spends his life thinking out great schemes
but never gets out of his dresaing gown,
became for many the amiable personification
of Russia. They overlooked the fact that the
Oblomovs represented only a tiny fraction
of the people, of whom, as a whole, they knew
very little. They forgot that the Russians
had conquered two fifths of the Eurasian.
continent in barely five hundred years.
Hence they never suspected that the Bolshe-
viks would succeed, by a shrewd falsification
of history, in merging Russian patriotism with
the drive toward a world revolution. •
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the first phase that on the forty-third day
of the German Western campaign the whole
of France had to conclude an armistice, it is
characteristic of the ph88e of matched power
that on the forty-third day of the inv88ioll
campaign the Allies have occupied less than
one per cent of France, notwithstanding
the fact that Germany is opposing them
witb only part of her annies, the majority
of them being in Eastern Europe and Italy.
Once the war bad entered its second phase,
a totally new situation arose. The German
High Command understood this. It changed
its strategy radically. Following tho rules
of cool reasoning and paying no attention
to questions of prestige, it went ou the
defensive and gradually withdrew its armies
from the Nile and the Volga to Central
Europe. But this geographical concentra-
tion of forccs was not enough. The entire
German war machine and economy, which
had been geared perfect,ly to the require-
ments of the wa.r's first phase, had to be
changed; the German Army, reared in the
spirit of da:lhing offensive, had also to be
trained for the harder task of large-scale with-
drawals; new wcapons had to be invent{ld
and mass-produced; the German nation,
accustomed to headlines telling of captured
cities and countrics, had to adjust itself to
the idea of a long war; and the occupied
countries had to be mobilized to a far
great{lr degree than before.
To the Anglo-Americans, who had a,)ways
clailned that the Germans were only able
to fight a war of the first-phase type, it
came as a surprise when they saw - how
quickly and completely Germany adapted
herself to the requirements of the second
phase. Yet there is nothing surprising in
this. Had the German nation been fighting
in order to win a quick and easy victory,
it might have been thrown off its ba,)ance
by the realization that there was no longer
any chanco of this. But Germany is not
just fighting for vict.ory: sho is fighting for a
decision, the decision over her life and her
future, the lieeision whether the Europe of
tomorrow will be a Soviet state or an Ameri-
can colony--or a community of nations based
on the spirit of neit~er Marx nor Morgan
but on that of 11 }<~uropean socialism. In
comparison to this goal, the question of
Rhort war or long war, yes, even of the
temporary loss of German territory, shrinks
in significance, amI once the Germans
realized that t,he decision could not be
brought about by the methods of tho first
phase they calmly went to work to ac-
complish it by the methods of t,he seeond
ph88e. For this they needed time. And
so, in this phase of matched power, we find
a completely different attitude toward the
time factor: now it W88 Germany who wa,'5
stalling for time, while the Allies were in a
hurry "to finish her off" before she W88 able
to adjust herself to the new situation.
Germany was aided in gaining time by
the Greater East Asia War, where two of
her enemies are locked in a grim struggle
with her ally Japan. Mter hONing met
with disastrous defeats, these common foes
of Gennany and Japan were only able to
wrest small parts of their former losses
from the heroically fighting Nipponese
armed forces at the cost of immense effort
and heavy losses. The battles in tho
Pacific contributed appreciably toward
delaying the full force of the Allied counter-
offensive and enabling Germany to prepare
for the next round.
THE CHANCES FOR SUPERIORITY
The great question is: how long is the
phase of matched power to last1 Will it be
followed by a new phase of supreme superi-
ority on one side? Let us consider the
possibilities one by one.
We can take it for granted that both
sides are doing their utmost to gain un-
challenged superiority. What are the Allied
chances of obtaining it? The Anglo-Ameri-
cans IJave been preparing the invasion for
years. They waited so long that they
became the object of scorn and ridicule on
the part of their Red allies. (One of the
SO\'iet jokes told in England before the
invasion had it that Churchill was roused
from bed at three o'clock in the morning by
an urgent telephone call. As ho took up
the receiver he heard Stalin's familiar voice
saying: "Hello, Winnie, I'm in Calais;
you ca.n come now, the danger is
over.") In the end, many people thought
the Allies had built up such overwhelmin~
forces during all this time that they would
crush the German 'armics once the invasion
had started. Indeed, we have every reason
to assume that since June 6 tbe Allies have
thrown everything they possess-not yet in
quantity, but in quality-into the struggle.
But the first month and a half of the invasion
battle has produced nothing that promises
to endow the Allies with the desired com
plete superiority over the Germa.us. It also
seems unlikely that they still have some-
thing up their sleeve which would suddenly
give them this superiority. Why should
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they be waating their strength in terrible
battles of attrition if they have the power
Bimply to overwhelm the Germans?
In following the battle in Normandy one
can hardly escape the conclusion that the
Allies greatly underestimated German
strength. The German press has probably
eontributed to this with its realistic de-
scriptions of Germany's situation. Some
people migbt even think that the wicked
Germans' purposely exaggera.ted their dif.
ficulties in order to make the popula.tions in
the AlLied camp relax their efforts, deceived
by the prospect that "if is all over anyway."
The Germans are more likely than the
Allies to have new weapons ready or in
preparation which they have not yet thrown
into the fray. They have a far better
reason for holding them in reserve: to wait
until sufficiently large Allied foroes have
landed to make their employment worth
while. Tho way in which the German
High Command postponed the use of the
V·I t.o just the right moment speaks for the
coobless of its decisions. There have been
hints from Berlin tbat the road from nothing
to V·l was far harder and longer than that
(rom V.] to V-2 and V-3.
THAT LAST OUNC.E
But in an objective analysis sucb as this
we must state bhat we cannot know for
certain whether such new weapons would
be able to end the phase of matched power
and reinst,all Germany in the unquestioned
superiority of the first pbase. Honco we
JOust also consider the remaining possibility
-namely, that the phase of matched power
will continue. In this case, what would be
tho outlook for Europe, apart from the
gradual pulverization of j<"rance, Italy,
Eastern Europe by the war, apart from the
mounting destruction of French, German,
and English towns froUl the air?
11 two men of cq ual strellgth fight in the
ring, the referee awards the vietory, after
all agreed number of rounds, to the mun
who has won the most points. But if there
is no agreed munoor of rounds and no ref-
eree to supervise the figbt--and that is
exactly tLUJ situation in Europe today-tlley
will fight until one or the other is too ex·
. hall8ted to continue, If they are evenly
lUltched, the cbanees are that by then tbe
other will also be near collapse, and that it
is just the willner's add itional ounce of
strength which carries him through beyond
'lis ad"enlllry's fall. TlJis extra ouncc is a
matter of spiritual rather than material
strength. Who is more likely to bave itt
The Red armies have stepped acr088 their
borders into foreign lands. There is dreadful
misery at borne. Will such ideas as "re·
venge," "world revolution," or "liberation
of tbe Slavs," be able to give tbem
tbat last ounce of strength? The Amerie8Jl8
fighting on European soil are many thoufWlds
of miles from their bomes. Even according
to their own figures, their 1088eS in the
second World War have already surpassed
those of tlte first. The question uppermost
in their minds must be: Why do we bave
to fight and die bere in Europe? The
attitude toward the war as we found it
expressed in recent American magazines and
described in our June and July issues is not
exactly the one to give that final deter·
mination to carryon to the end. Moreover,
both the USSR and the USA are huge
empires which would remain Illllong the
richest i.n the world even if their armies
were not to return vietorious.
The psychological situation of Germany
is totally different. By their insistence on
unconditional surronder and by the widely
broadcast discussion of their postwar plans,
her enemies have made it q \lite clear to
every German what is in store for him if
the Allies should ever be in a position to
dictate peace. If a German sol<lier were to
try to explain why he fight.s the way he
docs-to his last bullet o\"on when his own
position seems hopeless-he would probably
give an answer similar to tho 'one T'im,/!.',s
correspondent John Scott recently received.
Scott describes how at 11 Swedish airport he
happened to meet a German who had j list
arrived by plane from Germany. Tlieir
conversation ended in this way:
"We must win," the Gorman said suddenly in
n low voic:o. Ho looked up nt· me alld repeated:
"Wo've got to win." He miscd his voice and
struck t.he table lightly with hiB halld.. t·o emplaasi:r.e
hi; words. "We m'/u<e win!" The German's ("CO
had no l\nirnosity, but 8impl~' blind rosolution.
And if one wore to ask that German on
what he ba~es his hopes that his country
will win the great decision of this war, he
would say, not in these words but to this
effC'Ct: We will either·win back our military
superiority and fliug the .intruders out of
Europe in such a WilY that they will never
dare to come back, or, at the worllt, we will
make them pay lluch a terrible price for
every square mile of Eu.ropean soil that
they tbem:;el\'cs wiJ.l decidt' to g{·t ont while
there are still some of thl"m left.
